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Some problems of infinite regress in social-choice models: a category theory solution

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  • Fadi Alameddine

Abstract

An analysis of the infinite regress that appears in the statement of Gauthier's bargaining approach to social choice. The author shows how category theory provides the tools for constructing the appropriate bargaining models by furnishing a setting for the concepts of continuity, limits, and fixed points.

Suggested Citation

  • Fadi Alameddine, 1990. "Some problems of infinite regress in social-choice models: a category theory solution," Working Papers (Old Series) 9016, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9016
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-835, July.
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