Hybrid Political Institutions And Governability:The Budgetary Process In Brazil
AbstractIn this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by whichmajoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mixof majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence thesepathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences forgovernability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, wefocus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature,especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidentialcountries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/herto approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments.Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not thepresident can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability)depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individualamendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and thereforehelps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked toconsensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) in its series Textos para discussão with number 213.
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2010
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- Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2005.
"Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil,"
NBER Working Papers
11273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2006. "Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 87-114, April.
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