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The Political Economy of Health Services Provision in Brazil

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  • Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
  • Andrew Sunil Rajkumar
  • Maureen Cropper

Abstract

We examine the impact of local politics and voter preferences on the allocation of publicly subsidized the Unified and Decentralized Health Care System (SUS) health services across 4,338 counties in Brazil. SUS clinics, doctors, and nurses (per capita) are higher in counties with a higher share of uninsured in the population and with higher per capita incomes, as is consistent with a probabilistic voting model. Political participation (i.e., the fraction of the poor who vote) and the political power of the mayor (his vote share in the last election) are associated with more visible health inputs, namely, clinics and consultation rooms, but not with more doctors and nurses.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak & Andrew Sunil Rajkumar & Maureen Cropper, 2011. "The Political Economy of Health Services Provision in Brazil," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 723-751.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:doi:10.1086/660001
    DOI: 10.1086/660001
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    2. Wells, Rebecca & Cilenti, Dorothy & Issel, L. Michele, 2015. "The political economy of a public health case management program's transition into medical homes," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 98-106.
    3. Christine Buttorff & Antonio J. Trujillo & Fernando Ruiz & Jeannette L. Amaya, 2015. "Low rural health insurance take-up in a universal coverage system: perceptions of health insurance among the uninsured in La Guajira, Colombia," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 98-110, April.
    4. Lipscomb, Molly & Mobarak Mushfiq, Ahmed & Bahram, Tania, 2011. "Development effects of electrification: evidence from the geologic placement of hydropower plants in Brazil," Research Department working papers 218, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    5. Nagano, Hitoshi & Puppim de Oliveira, Jose A. & Barros, Allan Kardec & Costa Junior, Altair da Silva, 2020. "The ‘Heart Kuznets Curve’? Understanding the relations between economic development and cardiac conditions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).

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