Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric information on Private Environmental Benefits
AbstractWe investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the Principal and two groups of agents (landowners): a ‘green’ group deriving high private utility from the projects and a ‘conventional’ group deriving lower utility. Afforestation projects may be produced in different environmental quality, and we distinguish between two cases, a high quality and a low quality project. We find that the optimal set of contracts under asymmetric information involves two different contracts. One in which green landowners are somewhat overcompensated for projects of high quality, and one where conventional landowners are offered contracts including lower quality projects, compared to the symmetric case, but with compensation equal to his indifference payment. It is the ability to reduce quality requirements along with subsidies offered that allows for revelation of the private information. Finally, we discus how the results obtained may be used in the implementation of incentive schemes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2004.46.
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Principal-agent theory; Incentive schemes; Revelation principle; Environmental economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2004-10-21 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2004-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2004-07-18 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2004-07-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-RES-2004-07-18 (Resource Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ellen Moons & Sandra Rousseau, 2005. "Policy design and the optimal location of forests in Flanders," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische StudiÃ«n, Energy, Transport and Environment ete0505, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische StudiÃ«n, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl, 2009. "First-movers, non-movers, and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature-based recreational goods," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2363-2371, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.