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Duality of Power in the European Parliament

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Author Info
František Turnovec () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

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Abstract

Increasing number of studies is focusing attention to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Most of the studies are related to distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers as reflecting the influence of member states (or, more precisely, member states governments). Significantly less attention is paid to the analysis of European Parliament (EP). In this paper we address the following question: Taking as decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of “national” coordination of voting and in the case of “partisan” coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations) in the EP. In the both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a party), difference is only in dimension of aggregation. Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 2008/06.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision: Apr 2008
Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2008_06

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Related research
Keywords: a priori voting power; European Parliament; European political parties; power indices; Shapley-Shubik power index;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin Gregor & Lenka Gregorová, 2007. "Inefficient centralization of imperfect complements," Working Papers IES 2007/19, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ian Babetskii & Fabrizio Coricelli & Roman Horváth, 2007. "Measuring and Explaining Inflation Persistence: Disaggregate Evidence on the Czech Republic," Working Papers IES 2007/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Petr Jakubík & Jaroslav Heřmánek, 2008. "Stress testing of the Czech banking sector," Working Papers IES 2008/02, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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