How do people play against Nash opponents in games which have a mixed strategy equilibrium?
AbstractWe examine experimentally how humans behave when they, unbeknownst to them, play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash equilibrium strategy. But a larger percentage of subjects' play was more consistent with different models of play: equal-probable play for the zero-sum game, and the minimax strategy in the non-profitable game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series with number 2008-07.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision: Feb 2011
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2008-03-25 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-03-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-03-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-03-25 (Microeconomics)
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