A number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets. We examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of trading in a financial market where some agents have superiror information. We show that in some cases a tax on speculators may actually increase speculative profits. This occurs if the speculators' benefit from less informative prices offsets the cocts of the tax. The effect on the welfare of other agents depends on how revelation of information changes risk-sharing opportunities in the market. It is possible for the introduction of a tax to cause a Pareto improvement.
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Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number
eco97/21.
Length: 18 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco97/21
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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