Catching or fining speeders: a political economy approach
AbstractAccording to Becker (1968) it is best to use very high fines and low inspection probabilities to deter traffic accidents because inspection is costly. This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice of the fine and the inspection probability. There are two lobby groups: the vulnerable road users and the ‘strong’ road users. If only vulnerable road users are effective in lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between inspection probability and the magnitude of the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. The reverse holds if only the car drivers are effective lobbyists. The orders of magnitude are illustrated numerically for speeding and contrasted with current fines for drunk driving in the European Union.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces0714.
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Political economy; enforcement; traffic safety;
Other versions of this item:
- Delhaye Eef & Proost Stef & Rousseau Sandra, 2007. "Catching or Fining Speeders: A Political Economy Approach," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0702, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Delhaye, Eef & Proost, Stef & Rousseau, Sandra, 2007. "Catching or fining speeders: A political economy approach," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/120459, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-04-12 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
- Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 509-27, March.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
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