IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/enp/wpaper/eprg0824.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Analytic Solutions for Supply Function Equilibria: Uniqueness and Stability

Author

Listed:
  • David Newbery

    (Faculty of Economics University of Cambridge)

Abstract

Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) offer an attractive equilibrium concept for an electricity Pool in which all suppliers receive the market clearing price and are an important tool for examining market power. It is helpful to have analytical solutions available for simple models to explore market behaviour and to check computational solutions. This note derives analytic solutions for the symmetric case of linear and quadratic costs, and where each firm has an identical set of constant but different marginal cost technologies, as in most practical applications to data. Such stepped marginal cost schedules can replicate general marginal cost schedules to any desired degree of accuracy and hence symmetric SFEs can be solved analytically by piecing together recursively defined supply functions for general cost functions. The paper discusses the question of the uniqueness and stability of these symmetric solutions, but notes that finding asymmetric analytic solutions is generally difficult. It collects together and extends results scattered in earlier working papers to make them more accessible.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Newbery, 2008. "Analytic Solutions for Supply Function Equilibria: Uniqueness and Stability," Working Papers EPRG 0824, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg0824
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/eprg-wp0824.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    2. Par Holmberg, 2007. "Supply Function Equilibrium with Asymmetric Capacities and Constant Marginal Costs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 55-82.
    3. Holmberg, Par, 2008. "Unique supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 148-172, January.
    4. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    5. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David & Ralph, Daniel, 2013. "Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1509-1551.
    6. Ross Baldick & William Hogan, 2006. "Stability of supply function equilibria implications for daily versus hourly bids in a poolco market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 119-139, August.
    7. Edward J. Anderson & Xinmin Hu, 2008. "Finding Supply Function Equilibria with Asymmetric Firms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(3), pages 697-711, June.
    8. Holmberg, Pär, 2009. "Numerical calculation of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 199(1), pages 285-295, November.
    9. Ross Baldick & Ryan Grant & Edward Kahn, 2004. "Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 143-167, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Newbery, D., 2008. "Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0837, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Ayzenberg, N. & Kiseleva, N. & Zorkaltsev, V., 2013. "Models of Imperfect Competition in Analysis of Siberian Electricity Market," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 62-88.
    3. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David, 2010. "The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 209-226, December.
    4. Pär Holmberg, 2011. "Strategic Forward Contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 169-202.
    5. Alexander Vasin & Marina Dolmatova & Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber, 2016. "Supply function equilibria for uniform price auction in oligopolistic markets," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 24(4), pages 819-831, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David & Ralph, Daniel, 2013. "Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1509-1551.
    2. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David, 2010. "The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 209-226, December.
    3. Genc, Talat S. & Reynolds, Stanley S., 2011. "Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 432-442, July.
    4. Hunt Allcott, 2012. "The Smart Grid, Entry, and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 18071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Pär Holmberg, 2017. "Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 372-395, October.
    6. Bolle, Friedel & Grimm, Veronika & Ockenfels, Axel & del Pozo, Xavier, 2013. "An experiment on supply function competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 170-185.
    7. Majid Al-Gwaiz & Xiuli Chao & Owen Q. Wu, 2017. "Understanding How Generation Flexibility and Renewable Energy Affect Power Market Competition," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 19(1), pages 114-131, February.
    8. Anderson, Edward & Holmberg, Pär, 2018. "Price instability in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 318-341.
    9. Holmberg, Pär, 2009. "Numerical calculation of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 199(1), pages 285-295, November.
    10. Crawford, Gregory S. & Crespo, Joseph & Tauchen, Helen, 2007. "Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1233-1268, December.
    11. Anderson, E. & Holmberg, P., 2023. "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2339, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Joseph Mullins & Liam Wagner & John Foster, 2010. "Price Spikes in Electricity Markets: A Strategic Perspective," Energy Economics and Management Group Working Papers 05, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    13. Alexander Vasin & Marina Dolmatova & Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber, 2016. "Supply function equilibria for uniform price auction in oligopolistic markets," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 24(4), pages 819-831, December.
    14. Albert Banal-Estañol & Augusto Rupérez-Micola, 2010. "Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case," Economics Working Papers 1214, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    15. Ramesh Johari & John N. Tsitsiklis, 2011. "Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1079-1089, October.
    16. Albert Banal-Estañol & Augusto Rupérez Micola, 2009. "Composition of Electricity Generation Portfolios, Pivotal Dynamics, and Market Prices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(11), pages 1813-1831, November.
    17. Andreas Hefti & Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz, 2019. "Market power and information effects in a multi-unit auction," ECON - Working Papers 320, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    18. Delbono, Flavio & Lambertini, Luca, 2018. "Choosing roles under supply function competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 83-88.
    19. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1919-1966, November.
    20. Edward J. Anderson & Xinmin Hu, 2012. "Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibria with Forward Contracts," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 198-224, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supply function equilibria analytic solutions; electricity markets; stability; uniqueness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg0824. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ruth Newman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jicamuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.