The Interdependence Between Political and Economic Entrepreneurship
AbstractThe Chinese economy has developed rapidly despite two major constraints: ill-functioning markets and a socialist past, both of which caused an environment of unenforceable contracts. In this situation the need to pool resources and to govern relational risk was paramount to the development of a private sector. While modern organisation (transaction cost-) theory can explain why and to which extent entrepreneurship in China is based on collective agents, an analysis of the (local) political market is needed to explain why China's villages provide the much needed (and valuable) public goods in form of property rights protection and contractual security. Decentralisation and jurisdictional competition facilitate the writing of a new "common law" as well as the "discovery" of new forms of collective action.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam in its series ERIM Report Series Research in Management with number ERS-2000-43-ORG.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2000
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economic development; entrepreneurial economy; jurisdictional competition; organisational change;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
- O53 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
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