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Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Saptarshi Ghosh

    (Shiv Nadar University)

  • Peter Postl

    (University of Bath)

  • Jaideep Roy

    (Deakin University)

Abstract

We analyze the ‘optimal’ size of non-deliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is small, the optimal size is one; when it is intermediate, the optimal size increases monotonically in the precision of members’ private information; when it is large this relation is non-monotonic. However the optimal committee-size never exceeds five. We also show that biased persuasion typically hurts a larger committee more severely. These results provide important implications on issues like universal enfranchisement, role of expert commentary in a democracy or size of governing boards in firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Saptarshi Ghosh & Peter Postl & Jaideep Roy, 2017. "Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion," Department of Economics Working Papers 43/15, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:eid:wpaper:58147
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    File URL: https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/files/147426277/Persuasion_27_Jul_2016.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Jaideep & Silvers, Randy & Sun, Ching-Jen, 2019. "Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 269-288.

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