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On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

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  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
  • Feltkamp, Vincent

Abstract

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

Suggested Citation

  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Feltkamp, Vincent, 2007. "On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players," IKERLANAK 6480, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6480
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    File URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/6480
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 13(2), pages 331-341, December.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier, 2010. "Monotonic core solutions: Beyond Young's theorem," IKERLANAK 6373, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

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