Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Repositioning Dynamics and Pricing Strategy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ellickson, Paul B.

    (University of Rochester)

  • Misra, Sanjog

    (University of Rochester)

  • Nair, Harikesh S.

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

We measure the revenue and cost implications to supermarkets of changing their price positioning strategy in oligopolistic downstream retail markets. Our estimates have implications for long-run market structure in the supermarket industry, and for measuring the sources of price rigidity in the economy. We exploit a unique dataset containing the price-format decisions of all supermarkets in the U.S. The data contain the format-change decisions of supermarkets in response to a large shock to their local market positions: the entry of Wal-Mart. We exploit the responses of retailers to WalMart entry to infer the cost of changing pricing-formats using a .revealed-preference. argument similar to the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). The interaction between retailers and Wal-Mart in each market is modeled as a dynamic game. We find evidence that suggests the entry patterns of WalMart had a significant impact on the costs and incidence of switching pricing strategy. Our results add to the marketing literature on the organization of retail markets, and to a new literature that discusses implications of marketing pricing decisions for macroeconomic studies of price rigidity. More generally, our approach which incorporates long-run dynamic consequences, strategic interaction, and sunk investment costs, outlines how the paradigm of dynamic games may be used to model empirically firms' positioning decisions in Marketing.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2075.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2075.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2075

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Fax: (650)725-6750
Email:
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Paul Ellickson & Sanjog Misra, 2012. "Enriching interactions: Incorporating outcome data into static discrete games," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, March.
  2. Sanjog Misra & Harikesh Nair, 2011. "A structural model of salesforce compensation dynamics: Response to Profs. Rust and Staelin," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 267-273, September.
  3. Sanjog Misra, 2013. "Markov chain Monte Carlo for incomplete information discrete games," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 117-153, March.
  4. Victor Aguirregabiria & Junichi Suzuki, 2013. "Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit," Working Papers tecipa-475, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2075. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.