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Returns Policies for a Pessimistic Retailer

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  • Glenn, David

    (U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

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    Abstract

    Manufacturer buy-back policies are studied in the context of asymmetric demand information. A manufacturer offers a new product for sale to a retailer who makes a single stocking decision prior to the sales period. The two parties formulate different demand forecasts, either because they cannot share all relevent information or because the shared information lacks suffcient credibility. The manufacturer's pro t is, therefore, limited by the retailer's forecast which is relatively pessimistic. Offering to buy-back unsold items can induce the retailer to order more while supporting higher wholesale prices. It can also signal credibility for the manufacturer's optimistic forecast. Yet, the actual effect of buy-back depends on how the retailer regards the manufacturer's information. This paper characterizes two extremes: the retailer either deems the manufacturer to be better informed or less informed about demand. Buy-back serves as a signaling mechanism on the one hand and as an inducement on the other.

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    File URL: http://www.business.illinois.edu/Working_Papers/papers/04-0111.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business in its series Working Papers with number 04-0111.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:04-0111

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    Web page: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/Working_Papers/Main.asp
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    1. Wujin Chu, 1992. "Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 11(4), pages 327-347.
    2. Preyas S. Desai, 2000. "Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 381-389, August.
    3. Barry Alan Pasternack, 1985. "Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 166-176.
    4. Martin A. Lariviere & V. Padmanabhan, 1997. "Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 112-128.
    5. Gérard P. Cachon & Martin A. Lariviere, 2001. "Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 47(5), pages 629-646, May.
    6. Kandel, Eugene, 1996. "The Right to Return," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 329-56, April.
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