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Has the new bail-in framework increased the yield spread between subordinated and senior bonds?

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  • Pablos Nuevo, Irene

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the introduction and implementation of the new EU bail-in framework on the banks subordinated bond yield spreads over senior unsecured bonds, and links the bond yields developments with the characteristics of the issuing entities and the economic and financial environment. The analysis does not show evidence of a significant and generalized increase in the spreads as a result of a higher risk perception in the sample under review. The results reinforce the relevance of the Tier 1 capital ratio for making subordinated debt safer, while markets price the higher risk of banks with less stable sources of funding in their liability/capital structures. Market conditions and economic environment variables also play a key role in explaining bond spreads. Interestingly, after the introduction of the new bail-in framework, there is a convergence between the bond yields of the GSIBs and the non-GSIBs, which could point out to a reduction in the market perception of the so called “too big to fail” public implicit guarantee. Nonetheless, this convergence is mostly driven by the reduction of the yields of bonds issued by banks not categorized as GSIBs, and not by significant increases in the GSIBs’ bond yields. JEL Classification: G12, G14, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Pablos Nuevo, Irene, 2019. "Has the new bail-in framework increased the yield spread between subordinated and senior bonds?," Working Paper Series 2317, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20192317
    Note: 2859006
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2317~3a5259cba1.en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ulf Lewrick & José María Serena Garralda & Grant Turner, 2019. "Believing in bail-in? Market discipline and the pricing of bail-in bonds," BIS Working Papers 831, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Lindstrom, Ryan & Osborne, Matthew, 2020. "Has bail-in increased market discipline? An empirical investigation of European banks’ credit spreads," Bank of England working papers 887, Bank of England.
    3. Dr. Martin Indergand & Gabriela Hrasko, 2021. "Does the market believe in loss-absorbing bank debt?," Working Papers 2021-13, Swiss National Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bail-in; bank bond yields; too big to fail;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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