Liquidity provision through its repo auctions has been one of the main instruments of the European Central Bank (ECB) to address the recent tensions in financial markets since summer 2007. In this paper, we analyse banks’ bidding behaviour in the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs) during the ongoing turmoil in money and financial markets. We employ a unique data set comprising repo auctions from March 2004 to October 2008 with bidding data from 877 counterparties. We find that increased bid rates during the turmoil can be explained by, inter alia, the increased individual refinancing motive, the increased attractiveness of the ECB’s tender operations due to its collateral framework and banks’ bidding more aggressively, i.e. at higher rates to avoid being rationed at the marginal rate in times of increased liquidity uncertainty. JEL Classification: E52, D44, C33, C34.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number
1052.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
John Geweke & Gianni Amisano, 2008.
"Optimal Prediction Pools,"
Working Paper Series
22-08, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Jan 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: