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Honesty and Intermediation : Corporate Cheating, Auditor Involvement and the Implications for Development

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  • Brishti Guha

    (SMU)

Abstract

We examine self-enforcing honesty in firm-investor relations in an imperfect public information game. Minimum firm size requirements and moral hazard limit ability to raise outside capital, yielding a floor on personal wealth required to enter entrepreneurship. Credible auditing could create efficiency gains. We propose mandatory disclosure of audit fees and an interpretation of international differences in shareholding patterns. We endogenize auditor-firm collusion and extortion by auditors. We embed our game-theoretic analysis in a general equilibrium model to generate unique equilibria that trace the impact of the distribution of wealth on the existence of the market and consequences for development.

Suggested Citation

  • Brishti Guha, 2005. "Honesty and Intermediation : Corporate Cheating, Auditor Involvement and the Implications for Development," Microeconomics Working Papers 22426, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:eab:microe:22426
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Brishti Guha, 2005. "The Case of the Errant Executive : Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating," Working Papers 16-2005, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; moral hazard; vicious circles; inequality and development; general equilibrium; repeated games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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