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Exclusive Portfolio Dealing and Market Inefficiency

Author

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  • Natalie Kessler
  • Iman van Lelyveld
  • Ellen van der Woerd

Abstract

We rationalize exclusive portfolio dealing in a novel three-period partial equilibrium framework populated by a representative, risk-neutral seller and a small number of ex ante identical broker-dealers. Endowed with independent, uncertain demand for a representative asset, the broker-dealers may compete in prices for exclusivity. If no exclusivity is granted, due to either the lack or seller rejection of offers, the seller enters a second-price auction with a zero-loss reserve price. While seller profits are constant under exclusivity (Bertrand Paradox), auction profits increase in the number of broker-dealers. Therefore, exclusivity arises in equilibrium only for a seller with at most two broker-dealers, reducing the trade frequency by one-third. The results are robust to endogenizing the number of broker-dealers and to allowing for the ex post asymmetry in asset demand. Exclusivity, however, does not arise when the auction features a seller-optimal reserve price. We motivate and conclude with an application to the security lending market.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalie Kessler & Iman van Lelyveld & Ellen van der Woerd, 2024. "Exclusive Portfolio Dealing and Market Inefficiency," Working Papers 802, DNB.
    • Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:802
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    File URL: https://www.dnb.nl/media/k12jwfhu/working_paper_no-802.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ana Babus & Péter Kondor, 2018. "Trading and Information Diffusion in Over‐the‐Counter Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1727-1769, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exclusive Dealing; Intermediated Markets; Competition; Market Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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