Focused Power: Experimental Manifestation of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index
AbstractExperiments evaluate the fit of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index to a controlled human environment. Subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms under supervision. Earnings serve as a measure of power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects reduce or eliminate extraneous political forces, leaving logrolling as the primary political force. Initial proposals by subjects for division of the purse allow measurement of effects from focal points and transaction costs. Net results closely fit the Shapley-Shubik Power Index.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number 2007_13.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 23 Nov 2007
Date of revision:
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Voting; Power Index; Focal Point; Shapley-Shubik; Experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-06-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2009-06-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-06-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2009-06-03 (Positive Political Economics)
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