IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/werepe/we075227.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas

Author

Listed:
  • Cuesta, José A.
  • Jiménez Recaredo, Raúl José
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Lugo, Haydeé

Abstract

One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared we can cast a vast variety of scenarios, including traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the nplayer game as well as of the evolutionary dynamics. Beyond, we extend our analysis to a general class of public good games where competition among individuals with the same strategy exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Cuesta, José A. & Jiménez Recaredo, Raúl José & Sánchez, Angel & Lugo, Haydeé, 2007. "Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas," UC3M Working papers. Economics we075227, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we075227
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams/3fa5183f-706a-476b-8798-21e75f722b70/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haydée Lugo & Raúl Jiménez, 2006. "Incentives to Cooperate in Network Formation," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 15-27, August.
    2. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peña, Jorge & Lehmann, Laurent & Nöldeke, Georg, 2013. "Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games," Working papers 2013/13, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ozgur Aydogmus & Erkan Gürpinar, 2022. "Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1163-1188, December.
    2. Takuya Sekiguchi, 2023. "Fixation Probabilities of Strategies for Trimatrix Games and Their Applications to Triadic Conflict," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 1005-1033, September.
    3. Patrick Kane & Kevin J S Zollman, 2015. "An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(9), pages 1-14, September.
    4. Zibo Xu, 2013. "The instability of backward induction in evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Series dp633, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Bezin, Emeline & Ponthière, Gregory, 2019. "The tragedy of the commons and socialization: Theory and policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    6. Cressman, Ross & Hofbauer, Josef & Riedel, Frank, 2005. "Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    7. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
    8. Peña, Jorge & Nöldeke, Georg & Lehmann, Laurent, 2014. "Relatedness and synergies of kind and scale in the evolution of helping," Working papers 2014/09, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    9. Xinmiao An & Xiaomin Wang & Boyu Zhang, 2020. "Bimatrix Replicator Dynamics with Periodic Impulses," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 676-694, September.
    10. Josef Hofbauer & Simon M. Huttegger, 2015. "Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, January.
    11. Bernergård, Axel & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 82-97.
    12. Dai Zusai, 2018. "Tempered best response dynamics," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 1-34, March.
    13. Fabio Lamantia & Mario Pezzino, 2018. "The dynamic effects of fiscal reforms and tax competition on tax compliance and migration," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 672-690, August.
    14. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wu, 2016. "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 121, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    15. Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2016. "Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 451, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    16. Jean Rabanal & Daniel Friedman, 2014. "Incomplete Information, Dynamic Stability and the Evolution of Preferences: Two Examples," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 448-467, December.
    17. Dharini Hingu & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao & A. J. Shaiju, 2020. "On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 751-760, April.
    18. Steffen Jørgensen, 2012. "Book Review: "Games and Dynamic Games" Edited by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(02), pages 1-3.
    19. Aradhana Narang & A. J. Shaiju, 2021. "Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 304(1), pages 343-359, September.
    20. Dirk Helbing & Anders Johansson, 2010. "Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(10), pages 1-15, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reward;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we075227. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ana Poveda (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.