On the generic finiteness of outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms
AbstractWe provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induce a continuum of outcome distributions. The case for three or more players has been settled by Govindan and McLennan .
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we073520.
Date of creation: Apr 2007
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- Pimienta, Carlos, 2009.
"Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July.
- Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Pimienta, Carlos, 2010.
"Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 364-365, May.
- Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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