Industrial district are often described as systems of firms in static equilibrium, in which changes in the environment or in the power of stakeholders can break the cooperation mechanism and lead to the crisis and even death of the district. The authors analyse two industrial districts, Biella in Italy and Grasse in France, in which the worsening of competition has induced a deep evolution in the strategic behaviour of firms and in the asset of the district. Starting from this evidence they support the thesis that harder competition does not lead to a break in the district atmosphere, but to a change in its governance, in the mechanisms of interaction and level of commitment towards collective strategies.
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Paper provided by Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) in its series CERIS Working Paper with number
200710.