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Regard sur la ruse en économie

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  • Marc Deschamps

    (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE)

Abstract

Parce que l'économiste suppose généralement que l'agent économique est rationnel, il est évident que ce dernier cherchera par tous les moyens qui sont à sa disposition à satisfaire au mieux ses intérêts, y compris en utilisant la ruse. L'objet de cet article vise ainsi à éclairer quelques-unes des modalités que peut revêtir la notion de ruse en économie, sans évidemment prétendre en fournir une présentation exhaustive. A cette fin, nous choisissons de distinguer les situations où les agents économiques peuvent utiliser des ruses lorsqu'ils sont en concurrence entre eux (e.g stratégies mixtes en théorie des jeux, stratégies d'augmentation des coûts des concurrents), et celles où ils peuvent utiliser des ruses lorsqu'il s’agit de cas où le collectif est en jeu (e.g manipulation en matière de vote, demande et financement de biens publics).

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  • Marc Deschamps, 2019. "Regard sur la ruse en économie," Working Papers 2019-07, CRESE.
    • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Marc Deschamps, 2009. "Comment affecter les concurrents grâce au Droit? Les stratégies d'augmentation des coûts des rivaux," Post-Print halshs-00859247, HAL.
    5. Marc Deschamps, 2010. "La stratégie anticoncurrentielle d'augmentation des coûts des rivaux à travers l'exemple du contrat de travail," Post-Print halshs-00859189, HAL.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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