Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth
AbstractThis Paper analyses the link between the internal organization of firms, their individual life cycle and the whole process of macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internal collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, becoming more bureaucratized and less efficient over time. This bureaucratization affects both the intertemporal distribution of profits in a given sector and the distribution of output across sectors. In a general equilibrium model, bureaucratization has two effects: a profitability effect on the return of innovation and a reallocation effect on the skilled labour market. First, we analyse the existence and properties of stationary equilibrium growth. Second, we endogenize the transaction costs of side-contracting and show how the growth rate depends on various organizational parameters of firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2700.
Date of creation: Feb 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth," Papers 1999-09, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
- Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth," DELTA Working Papers 1999-09, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
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- Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Aghion, Philippe, 2003.
"Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier,"
4481512, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Aghion, Philippe & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2002. "Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier," CEPR Discussion Papers 3565, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2002. "Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier," NBER Working Papers 9191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Knobel, A., 2009. "Vertical Integration and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 3-4, pages 54-70.
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