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On the Role of Conflicting National Interests in the ECB Council

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  • Grüner, Hans Peter
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    Abstract

    This paper studies the strategic interaction of Euroland's national macroeconomic players and the ECB council under two alternative assumptions on central bank behavior: (i) all members of the ECB council are concerned about Euroland's macroeconomic aggregates and (ii) the ECB council is composed of national central bankers who are mainly concerned about domestic macroeconomic conditions. Under the former assumption monetary policy can be used to impose some discipline on national macroeconomic players at the cost of higher inflation. Under the predominance of national interests however, this trade-off can no longer be exploited. The persistence of national perspectives in the ECB council has an adverse impact on the relationship between key macroeconomic variables such a inflation and unemployment or inflation and the level of government debt.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2192.

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    Date of creation: Jul 1999
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    Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2192

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    Related research

    Keywords: Central Bank Council; EMU; Wage/Fiscal Discipline;

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    Cited by:
    1. Hans Peter Gruener & Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2009. "Unions, Wage Setting and Monetary Policy Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 40.
    2. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2004. "One country, one vote? Labor market structure and voting rights in the ECB," Discussion Papers 2004/10, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    3. Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Federal Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 422, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
    5. Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2001. "A Reform Proposal for EMU Institutions," MPRA Paper 18694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Frey, Rainer, 2009. "The design of an asymmetric currency union with shock persistence and spillovers: Short-term versus medium-term," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 85-97, March.

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