On the Foundations of Wage Bargaining
AbstractThis paper provides strategic foundations for the insight that the bargaining power of employees depends on the firm’s labour turnover costs. The analysis shows how these costs determine the firm’s degree of substitutability between two sets of wage negotiations: (i) those the firm conducts with its incumbent employees; and (ii) the alternative negotiations it could conduct with new job seekers. In this context, labour turnover costs not only influence the negotiators’ alternatives to bargaining (i.e. the negotiators’ fall-back positions and outside options); they affect the nature of the bargaining process itself. This approach leads to a new theory of wage determination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1514.
Date of creation: Nov 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Paola Manzini & Dennis Snower, 1996. "On the Foundations of Wage Bargaining," Archive Discussion Papers 9614, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Manzini, P. & Snower, D.J., 1996. "On the Foundations of Wage Bargaining," Discussion Papers 9616, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions
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- Diaz-Vazquez, Pilar & Snower, Dennis J., 2002.
"Can Insider Power Affect Employment?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3472, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Díaz-Vázquez, Pilar & Snower, Dennis J., 2003. "Can insider power affect employment?," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2992, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
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