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Market Structure and Competition in Airline Markets

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  • Ciliberto, Federico
  • ,
  • ,

Abstract

We provide an econometric framework for estimating a game of simultaneous entry and pricing decisions while allowing for correlations between unobserved cost and demand shocks. We use our framework to account for selection in the pricing stage. We estimate the model using data from the US airline industry and find that not accounting for endogenous entry leads to biased estimation of demand elasticities. We simulate a merger between American and US Airways and find that product repositioning and post-merger outcomes depend on how we model the characteristics of the merged firm as a function of the pre-merger firms' characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Ciliberto, Federico & , & ,, 2018. "Market Structure and Competition in Airline Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 13346, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13346
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    1. Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tin Cheuk Leung & Shi Qi, 2023. "Globalization and the rise of action movies in hollywood," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 47(1), pages 31-69, March.
    2. Keith Head & Thierry Mayer, 2019. "Brands in Motion: How Frictions Shape Multinational Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3073-3124, September.
    3. Yongjoon Park, 2020. "Competition Effects of Airport Slot-Swap: An Analysis of the Delta/US Airways Deal," Working Papers 20-11, NET Institute.
    4. Mark J Roberts & Daniel Yi Xu & Xiaoyan Fan & Shengxing Zhang, 2018. "The Role of Firm Factors in Demand, Cost, and Export Market Selection for Chinese Footwear Producers," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2429-2461.
    5. Nail Kashaev & Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Discerning Solution Concepts," Papers 1909.09320, arXiv.org.
    6. Áureo de Paula, 2020. "Econometric Models of Network Formation," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 775-799, August.
    7. Lixiong Li & D'esir'e K'edagni & Ismael Mourifi'e, 2020. "Discordant Relaxations of Misspecified Models," Papers 2012.11679, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    8. Bontemps, Christian & Remmy, Kevin & Wei, Jiangyu, 2021. "Ex-post evaluation of the American Airlines-US Airways merger: a structural approach," TSE Working Papers 21-1258, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Doug J. Chung & Kyoungwon Seo & Reo Song, 2023. "Efficient computation of discrete games: Estimating the effect of Apple on market structure," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2245-2263, July.
    10. José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez & Álvaro Parra & Yuzhou Wang, 2023. "Equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 512-540, September.
    11. , 2023. "Price Competition and Endogenous Product Choice in Networks: Evidence from the US airline Industry," Working Papers 950, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    12. Amit Gandhi & Jean-François Houde, 2019. "Measuring Substitution Patterns in Differentiated-Products Industries," NBER Working Papers 26375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Balat, Jorge F. & Han, Sukjin, 2023. "Multiple treatments with strategic substitutes," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 234(2), pages 732-757.
    14. Haucap, Justus & Stiebale, Joel, 2023. "Non-price effects of mergers and acquisitions," DICE Discussion Papers 402, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. Lin, Zhongjian & Vella, Francis, 2021. "Selection and Endogenous Treatment Models with Social Interactions: An Application to the Impact of Exercise on Self-Esteem," IZA Discussion Papers 14167, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/mlkvtnbqe9pg8nsvf612mcnbs is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Keith Head & Thierry Mayer, 2019. "Brands in Motion: How Frictions Shape Multinational Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3073-3124, September.
    18. Thomas M. Russell, 2020. "Policy Transforms and Learning Optimal Policies," Papers 2012.11046, arXiv.org.
    19. Paul S. Koh, 2022. "Estimating Discrete Games of Complete Information: Bringing Logit Back in the Game," Papers 2205.05002, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple equilibria; market power; Self-selection; Entry; Oligopoly; Market structure; Merger;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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