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Objectivity, priority, and the veil of ignorance

Author

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  • MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D.
  • ROEMER, John E.

Abstract

The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool of recommending what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We complete Harsanyi's model of the veil of ignorance by appending information permitting objective comparisons among persons. We show that the veil-of-ignorance conception of John Harsanyi, so completed, and Donald Dworkin's, when modeled formally, recommend wealth allocations in conflict with the prominently espoused view that priority should be given to the disabled in wealth allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Objectivity, priority, and the veil of ignorance," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005081, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2005081
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2005.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1977. "Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 219-225, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2008. "The ignorant observer," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 193-232, August.
    2. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2006. "The Ignorant Observer," Post-Print halshs-00115722, HAL.
    3. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2008. "The ignorant observer," Post-Print halshs-00177374, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    impartiality; ob jectivity; priority; veil of ignorance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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