Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts
AbstractA minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further ine±- ciencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA in its series BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA with number 005222.
Date of creation: 14 Jan 2009
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-01-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-01-31 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2009-01-31 (Insurance Economics)
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