Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Optimal Leniency Programs in Antitrust

Contents:

Author Info

  • A. Pinna

    ()

Abstract

This paper analyses the incentive structure underlying the adoption of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement. The enforcement of competition law is treated as the delegation of the economic activity from the government to private firms. The model contributes to the debate over desirability of granting leniency to more than one cartelists. For this purpose, I introduce a probability of conviction that depends on authority-specific characteristics. This results in the optimal number of leniencies being specific to national authorities and market structures. The model confirms a result widely acknowledged in the antitrust literature - a program that merely reduces sanctions to the first reporter is ineffective.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/node/2926
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?file=http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/sites/default/files/WP10-18.pdf&nid=2926
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number 201018.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201018

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via S. Giorgio 12, I-09124 Cagliari
Phone: +70/6756406
Fax: +70/6756402
Email:
Web page: http://www.crenos.unica.it/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: leniency; deterrence; antitrust;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2011. "Corporate Leniency with Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption," Economics Working Paper Archive 573, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antonello Pau).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.