Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Penn Economics Department in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number 45c846ad903decd7bf77b1c66030615a.
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- Nicola Persico, . ""Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information''," CARESS Working Papres 99-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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- Tilman Börgers, 2001.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
625018000000000232, David K. Levine.
- Cesar Martinelli, 2000.
"Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting,"
0005, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
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