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Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous Time Games

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  • Eduardo Faingold
  • Yuri Sannikov

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  • Eduardo Faingold & Yuri Sannikov, 2007. "Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous Time Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001487, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001487
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    File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16a/d1624.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eduardo Faingold & Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1624, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Eduardo Faingold & Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Equilibrium Degeneracy and Reputation Effects," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000216, www.najecon.org.
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Jingyuan & Liu, Yongming & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 523-533, December.
    2. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Eduardo Faingold & Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1624, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Kyna Fong, "undated". "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    5. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Osório António M., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, April.
    7. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    8. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

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    1. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Li, Jingyuan & Liu, Yongming & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 523-533, December.
    3. Kyna Fong, "undated". "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Osório António M., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, April.
    5. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
    7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
    8. Eduardo Faingold & Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1624, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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