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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001035.
Date of creation: 13 Jan 2006
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- NEP-ALL-2006-01-24 (All new papers)
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- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006.
122247000000001211, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008.
"Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs,"
2000, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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