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Computing Equilibria of n-person Games

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  • Robert Wilson

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 402.

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Date of creation: 09 Dec 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:402

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Cited by:
  1. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1799, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. McDonald, Stuart & Wagner, Liam, 2010. "The Computation of Perfect and Proper Equilibrium for Finite Games via Simulated Annealing," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151191, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  3. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Satterthwaite, Mark, 2007. "Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity," CEPR Discussion Papers 6212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ulrich Doraszelski & Mark Satterthwaite, 2007. "Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000912, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Inarra, E. & Larrea, C. & Saracho, A., 2010. "Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 141-147, March.
  6. Barry O'Neill, 1982. "The Simplest Three-Person Non-Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 534, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van den Elzen, Antoon, 2002. "Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 89-117, January.
  8. P. Herings & Ronald Peeters, 2010. "Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 119-156, January.
  9. Anderlini, Luca & Canning, David, 2000. "Structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0002, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  10. Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information 9707006, EconWPA.
  11. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald J. A. P., 2004. "Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 32-60, September.
  12. Bernhard Stengel, 2010. "Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 1-7, January.
  13. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2003. "A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 65-86, May.
  14. Anderlini, Luca & Canning, David, 2001. "Structural Stability Implies Robustness to Bounded Rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 395-422, December.
  15. Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik & Dickey Yan, 1995. "Dumb Bugs and Bright Noncooperative Players: Games, Context and Behavior," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1094, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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