Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Inequality and Riots – Experimental Evidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Klaus Abbink
  • David Masclet

    ()

  • Daniel Mirza

Abstract

We study the relationship between inequality and inter-groups conflicts (riots), focussing on social inequality. Disadvantaged societal groups experience discrimination and thus have limited access to some social and labour resources like education or employment. First, we experimentally investigate whether social inequality is a driving force of inter-group conflicts. Second, we investigate the factors that make preferences for riot translate into actions. Riots require coordination. Our experiment consists of a two-stage game. First, subjects play a proportional rent-seeking game to share a prize. Social inequality is modelled exogenously by attributing to some subjects (the advantaged group) a larger share of the price than other subjects (the disadvantaged group) for the same amount of effort. In a second stage players can coordinate with the other members of their group to reduce (“burn”) the other group members’ payoff. Treatments differ in the degree of social inequality set between the two groups. We observe frequent social conflicts, where, as expected, disadvantaged groups riot more than advantaged groups. Surprisingly, the frequency of riots decreases with the degree of inequality. A control treatment allows us to identify resignation as the driving force behind this phenomenon. Nous étudions dans cet article la relation entre inégalité et conflits inter-groupes. L’approche mobilisée est l’économie expérimentale. Le jeu expérimental est un jeu en deux étapes. Dans une première étape, les participants jouent un « rent seeking » proportionnel afin de se partager un prix. Les inégalités sont modélisées de sorte que certains agents (les joueurs de type A, favorisés) reçoivent davantage du prix pour un même montant investi que d’autres joueurs (les joueurs de type D, défavorisés). En deuxième étape, les joueurs de chaque type peuvent se coordonner afin de réduire le gain des membres de l’autre groupe. Nous observons que les conflits diminuent avec le degré d’inégalité entre les groupes. Ces résultats semblent s’expliquer par des préférences compétitives fortes et des effets de résignation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2011s-10.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2011s-10.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Design of experiments; Experimental economics; Social Inequality; Conflicts.; Design d’expérience; économie expérimentale; inégalités sociales; conflits;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jérémy Celse, 2009. "Will Joe the Plumber envy Bill Gates? The impact of both absolute and relative differences on interdependent preferences," Working Papers 09-26, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
  2. Lenouvel, Vincent & Montginoul, Marielle, 2010. "Groundwater Management Instruments in a Conjunctive Use System: Assessing the Impact on Farmers’ Income Using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)," Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development, Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development, vol. 59(3).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.