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A bargaining model for finite n-person multi-criteria games

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    Abstract

    In this paper we consider a multi-criteria game model which allows interactions between players. The problem addressed is considered as a cooperative game in order to achieve consensus solutions which are evaluated with respect to several criteria simultaneously. The main idea consists of analyzing finite multi-criteria n-person games as multi-criteria bargaining games. The notion of Pareto-optimal guaranteed payoffs as a generalization of the maximin values of scalar games is proposed, together with two different solution concepts which can be characterized as the solutions of multi-criteria linear programming problems. A procedure to incorporate additional information about the agents' preferences in order to reach a final consensus is also provided.

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    File URL: http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200521.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2005/21.

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    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2005_21

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    Keywords: Finite multi-criteria games. Bargaining games. Multi-criteria analysis;

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    1. Zhao, Jingang, 1991. "The Equilibria of a Multiple Object Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 171-82.
    2. Borm, P.E.M. & Vermeulen, D. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "The structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-117079, Tilburg University.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
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