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Temporal interaction of information and belief

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

The temporal updating of an agent?s beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t , contains a normal belief operator B_t and a non-normal information operator I_t which is analogous to the ?only knowing? operator discussed in the computer science literature. Soundness and completeness of the logic are proved and the relationship between the proposed logic and the AGM theory of belief revision is discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2005. "Temporal interaction of information and belief," Working Papers 141, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:141
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    File URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/8SggYet7uooJoC6GbC8F9wCX/05-41.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 164, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July.
    4. Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
    5. Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 45, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information; belief revision; Bayes rule; modal logic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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