Morten Hviid () (School of Law and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia) Andrei Medvedev () (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)
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To date the experience of the incidence of private actions for damages in antitrust cases has differed markedly across jurisdictions. The procedural rules surrounding private litigation may account for some of these differences. This paper explores the effect of rules concerning contribution among multiple defendants who are joint and severally liable for a cartel infringement. The no-contribution rule is shown to lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information revelation to the private plaintiff. However, the no-contribution rule also has the potential to neuter any public leniency programme, thereby possibly reducing the number of cartels detected.
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Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number
08-3.
Find related papers by JEL classification: K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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