Signal Jamming in Pretrial Negotiation with Multiple Defendants
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 91 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
cross-type subsidization; joint and several liability; pretrial negotiation; signal jamming; K41;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kim Jeong-Yoo, 2003. "Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-20, November.
- Hviid, Morten & Medvedev, Andrei, 2010.
"The role of contribution among defendants in private antitrust litigation,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 306-316, December.
- Morten Hviid & Andrei Medvedev, 2008. "The Role of Contribution among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation," Working Papers 08-3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
- Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2009. "Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 263-276, April.
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