Exploring the Determinants of ‘Best Practice’ in Network Regulation: The Case of the Electricity Sector
AbstractIn this paper we use a best practice index constructed from the survey responses of regulators in 40 countries to explore the determinants of outcomes in electricity network regulation. We construct a model of explained behaviour where we are particularly interested in understanding the impact of industry setting, political, and economic environments on the degree of best practice regulation. Our results suggest that political and economic institutions as well as the behaviour of regulators in neighbouring countries/states may be important determinants of outcomes; this also leads us to question whether one “best practice” model is in fact applicable to countries with very different political and economic contexts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1020.
Date of creation: 30 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Network regulation; Electricity; Efficiency analysis; Institutions;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-04-24 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-04-24 (Regulation)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jean-Michel Glachant & Haikel Khalfallah & Yannick Perez & Vincent Rious & Marcelo Saguan, 2013. "Implementing incentive regulation through an alignment with resource bounded regulators," Post-Print halshs-00767872, HAL.
- J-M- Glachant & H. Khalfallah & Y. Perez & V. Rious & M. Saguan, 2013.
"Implementing Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Alignment with Resource Bounded Regulators,"
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia,
Intersentia, vol. 14(3), pages 265-291, September.
- Jean-Michel Glachant, Haikel Khalfallah, Yannick Perez, Vincent Rious and Marcelo Saguan, 2012. "Implementing Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Alignment with Resource Bounded Regulators," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute 2012/31, European University Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.