AbstractEurope is liberalising electricity in accordance with the European Commission’s Electricity Directives. Different countries have responded differently, notably in the extent of restructuring, treatment of mergers, market power, and vertical unbundling. While Britain and Norway have achieved effective competition, others like Germany, Spain and France are still struggling to deal with dominant and sometimes vertically integrated companies. The Netherlands offers an interesting intermediate case, where good economic analysis has sometimes been thwarted by legalistic interpretations. Investment under the new Emissions Trading system could further transform the electricity industry but may be hampered by slow progress in liberalising European gas markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0615.
Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Competition; liberalisation; restructuring; electricity; market power;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-02-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-02-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EEC-2006-02-19 (European Economics)
- NEP-ENE-2006-02-19 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-FIN-2006-02-19 (Finance)
- NEP-IND-2006-02-19 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2006-02-19 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2006-02-19 (Microeconomics)
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