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Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA

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  • Roques, F.
  • Newbery, D.M.
  • Nuttall, W.J.

Abstract

Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the Pool capacity payments design, the drought of investment following the introduction of NETA, and the reaction of the market during the first “stress-test” of NETA during the winter 2003. In an energy-only market such as NETA, it is essential that price signals are right and the system operator has a crucial role in contracting ahead for reserve. We recommend that NETA adopt a single marginal imbalance price as dual imbalance pricing distorts price signals in times of scarcity. The lack of long-term contracting that causes hedging and financing difficulties for power projects can be compensated by vertical and horizontal reintegration at a cost of increased market power.

Suggested Citation

  • Roques, F. & Newbery, D.M. & Nuttall, W.J., 2004. "Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0459, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0459
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    Cited by:

    1. Brunekreeft, G. & McDaniel, T., 2005. "Policy uncertainty and supply adequacy in electric power," Discussion Paper 2005-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Karakatsani, Nektaria V. & Bunn, Derek W., 2008. "Forecasting electricity prices: The impact of fundamentals and time-varying coefficients," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 764-785.
    3. Karakatsani Nektaria V & Bunn Derek W., 2010. "Fundamental and Behavioural Drivers of Electricity Price Volatility," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 1-42, September.
    4. Karakatsani, Nektaria V. & Bunn, Derek W., 2008. "Intra-day and regime-switching dynamics in electricity price formation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1776-1797, July.
    5. Rosellon, Juan, 2006. "Different Approaches to Supply Adequacy in Electricity Markets," MPRA Paper 21944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Meade, Richard, 2005. "Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems," Working Paper Series 3859, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    7. Spodniak, Petr & Bertsch, Valentin, 2017. "Determinants of power spreads in electricity futures markets: A multinational analysis," Papers WP580, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    8. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18954 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Meade, Richard, 2005. "Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems," Working Paper Series 18954, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    investment; electricity; market design; capacity payments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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