AbstractAn abstract notion of aggregative games is introduced and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium shown to exist for such games. Convergence of best-reply improvement dynamics is also studied. All assumptions are straight-forward to check in concrete applications. The paper’s results generalize the main results of Dubey et al. (2006) and Kukushkin (2005). Likewise, the aggregator concept of Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005) and Schipper (2005) is a special case. The relationship with both is studied in detail. A number of examples illustrate the paper’s main findings. Among these a model of open source development may be of some independent interest.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 06-10.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Aggregative Games; Aggregation; Strategic Substitutes; Nash Equilibrium; Potential Game; Best-reply Dynamics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Martin Jensen, 2010. "Aggregative games and best-reply potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 45-66, April.
- Dominik Erharter, 2013. "Promoting coordination in summary-statistic games," Working Papers 2013-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Jensen, Martin Kaae, 2009.
"Aggregate Comparative Statics,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7254, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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