An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies
AbstractFor any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 245.
Date of creation: Sep 1995
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Trockel, Walter, 1996. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Economics Series 25, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Walter Trockel, 1999.
"On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
788, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Trockel,W., 1999. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Working Papers 306, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Trockel,W., 1999.
"Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory,"
305, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
- Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Frederik Herzberg).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.