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Output-orientierte Regulierung – ein Überblick

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Listed:
  • Gert Brunekreeft
  • Julia Kusznir
  • Roland Meyer

Abstract

Dieser Bericht greift mit der output-orientierten Regulierung (OOR) eine aktuelle Entwicklung in der Regulierungspraxis auf, die insbesondere durch die Energiewende an Relevanz gewinnt. Ziel der OOR ist die gezielte Beanreizung vorgegebener Leistungsziele (Outputs), die im Rahmen einer ansonsten vorwiegend auf Kosteneffizienz ausgerichteten Anreizregulierung nicht im gesellschaftlich erwünschten Maße gefördert werden. Dabei ersetzt OOR nicht die bestehende Erlösobergrenze der Anreizregulierung, sondern ergänzt diese um Erlöselemente (wie Bonus/Malus-Zahlungen), die an das Erreichen regulatorisch vorgegebener Outputziele gekoppelt sind. In der zu Grunde liegenden Studie wurden die zentralen ökonomischen Gründe für den Einsatz output-orientierter Regulierungsinstrumente erörtert sowie konkrete Anwendungsbereiche für die Regulierung von Stromnetzbetreibern aufgezeigt und diskutiert. Dabei stehen drei Begründungen für OOR im Vordergrund: 1. value creation, 2. Whole System Approach, und 3. kostenseitige Verzerrung und Risiko. Häufig lassen sich die Begründungen auf externe Effekte zurückführen, die mittels OOR internalisiert werden können. Dabei ist die konkrete Umsetzung jedoch je nach Anwendungsbereich mit Herausforderungen verbunden, die im Rahmen der Untersuchung nur angedeutet werden konnten und einer tiefer gehenden Analyse bedürfen.

Suggested Citation

  • Gert Brunekreeft & Julia Kusznir & Roland Meyer, 2020. "Output-orientierte Regulierung – ein Überblick," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0035, Bremen Energy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:bei:00bewp:0035
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    File URL: https://bremen-energy-research.de/wp-content/bewp/bewp35.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capex-bias; risk; electric utilities; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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