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Linear Programming Based Near-Optimal Pricing for Laminar Bayesian Online Selection

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  • Nima Anari
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Amin Saberi
  • Ali Shameli

Abstract

The Bayesian online selection problem aims to design a pricing scheme for a sequence of arriving buyers that maximizes the expected social welfare (or revenue) subject to different structural constraints. Inspired by applications with a hierarchy of service, this paper focuses on the cases where a laminar matroid characterizes the set of served buyers. We give the first Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the problem when the laminar matroid has constant depth. Our approach is based on rounding the solution of a hierarchy of linear programming relaxations that approximate the optimum online solution with any degree of accuracy, plus a concentration argument showing that rounding incurs a small loss. We also study another variation, which we call the production-constrained problem. The allowable set of served buyers is characterized by a collection of production and shipping constraints that form a particular example of a laminar matroid. Using a similar LP-based approach, we design a PTAS for this problem, although in this special case the depth of the underlying laminar matroid is not necessarily a constant. The analysis exploits the negative dependency of the optimum selection rule in the lower levels of the laminar family. Finally, to demonstrate the generality of our technique, we employ the linear programming-based approach employed in the paper to re-derive some of the classic prophet inequalities known in the literature -- as a side result.

Suggested Citation

  • Nima Anari & Rad Niazadeh & Amin Saberi & Ali Shameli, 2018. "Linear Programming Based Near-Optimal Pricing for Laminar Bayesian Online Selection," Papers 1807.05477, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1807.05477
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Bellman, 1954. "Some Applications of the Theory of Dynamic Programming---A Review," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 275-288, August.
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    3. Jason D. Hartline, 2012. "Approximation in Mechanism Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 330-336, May.
    4. Shuchi Chawla & Jason Hartline & David Malec & Balasubramanian Sivan, 2010. "Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1486, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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