IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1805.06687.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Happy family of stable marriages

Author

Listed:
  • Gershon Wolansky

Abstract

Some aspects of the problem of stable marriage are discussed. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants, and the fully non transferable case where each participant has its own rigid preference list regarding the other gender. We continue to discuss intermediate partial transferable cases. Partial transferable plans can be approached as either special cases of cooperative games using the notion of a core, or as a generalization of the cyclical monotonicity property of the fully transferable case (fake promises). We shall introduced these two approaches, and prove the existence of stable marriage for the fully transferable and non-transferable plans.

Suggested Citation

  • Gershon Wolansky, 2018. "Happy family of stable marriages," Papers 1805.06687, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1805.06687
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.06687
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    2. Alfred Galichon, 2016. "Optimal Transport Methods in Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10870.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alfred Galichon, 2016. "Optimal transport methods in economics," Post-Print hal-03256830, HAL.
    5. Robert P. Gilles, 2010. "The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-642-05282-8, March.
    6. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    2. Salanié, Bernard & Chiappori, Pierre-André, 2021. "Mating Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2021. "Mating Markets," Working Papers 2021-016, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    3. Alfred Galichon, 2021. "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Optimal Transport in Economics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03936221, HAL.
    4. Alfred Galichon, 2021. "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Optimal Transport in Economics," Working Papers hal-03936221, HAL.
    5. Alfred Galichon, 2021. "The unreasonable effectiveness of optimal transport in economics," Papers 2107.04700, arXiv.org.
    6. Brendan Pass, 2019. "Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(2), pages 393-419, March.
    7. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2020. "Pre-matching gambles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 76-89.
    8. Kuan‐Ming Chen & Yu‐Wei Hsieh & Ming‐Jen Lin, 2023. "Reducing Recommendation Inequality Via Two‐Sided Matching: A Field Experiment Of Online Dating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1201-1221, August.
    9. Dupuy, Arnaud & Galichon, Alfred & Sun, Yifei, 2016. "Estimating Matching Affinity Matrix under Low-Rank Constraints," IZA Discussion Papers 10449, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Brendan Pass, 2017. "Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing models," Papers 1701.04431, arXiv.org.
    11. Gueyon Kim & Dohyeon Lee, 2020. "Offshoring and Segregation by Skill: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2020-073, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    12. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2021. "Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2929-2974, November.
    13. He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021. "Experimental and Noncooperative Analyses of Decentralized Matching with Transfers," Working Papers 2021-2, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    14. Simon Clark, 2020. ""You're Just My Type!" Matching and Payoffs When Like Attracts Like," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 295, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    15. Aloysius Siow & Eric Mak, 2017. "Occupational Choice and Matching in the Labor Market," 2017 Meeting Papers 30, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Papers 2109.07932, arXiv.org.
    17. Edoardo Ciscato & Alfred Galichon & Marion Goussé, 2020. "Like Attract Like? A Structural Comparison of Homogamy across Same-Sex and Different-Sex Households," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 740-781.
    18. Pablo D. Fajgelbaum & Edouard Schaal, 2020. "Optimal Transport Networks in Spatial Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1411-1452, July.
    19. Ran Abramitzky & Adeline Delavande & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 124-157, July.
    20. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2022. "Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models [An Empirical Model of the Medical Match]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(5), pages 2600-2629.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1805.06687. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.