Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
AbstractThe existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown in several contexts under a general condition called "coarser transition kernels". These results include various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases. The minimality of the condition is illustrated. The results here also shed some new light on a recent example on the nonexistence of stationary equilibrium. The proofs are remarkably simple via establishing a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of correspondences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by arXiv.org in its series Papers with number 1311.1562.
Date of creation: Nov 2013
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Web page: http://arxiv.org/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-11-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Duggan, 2012. "Noisy Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2017-2045, 09.
- Yehuda (John) Levy, 2012. "A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp596r, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised May 2012.
- John Duggan, 2012. "Noisy Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 570, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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