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Markovian Elections

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  • Jean Guillaume Forand

    (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo)

  • John Duggan

    (Department of Economics, University of Rochester)

Abstract

We establish existence and continuity properties of equilibria in a model of dynamic elections with a discrete (countable) state space and general policies and preferences. We provide conditions under which there is a representative voter in each state, and we give characterization results in terms of the equilibria of an associated “representative voting game.” When the conditions for these results are not met, we provide examples that uncover new classes of dynamic political failures.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Waterloo, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1305.

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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision: Oct 2013
Handle: RePEc:wat:wpaper:1305

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