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Candidate Stability and Probabilistic Voting Procedures

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  • Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo

Abstract

We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each configuration of the agenda and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a probabilistic voting procudure selects a lottery on the set of candidates at stake. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to leave the ballot independently of the composition of the agenda. However, more flexible rules can be divised if we focus on the stability of specific agendas.
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Suggested Citation

  • Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003. "Candidate Stability and Probabilistic Voting Procedures," Economic Research Papers 269480, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269480
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269480
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    2. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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